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 PROPENSITIES AND PRAGMATISM* 
 
Abstract: A pragmatist conception of propensity is outlined, and defended 
against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, 
prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paradox is reviewed, and one of its key 
assumptions is identified. The identity thesis states that propensities are 
probabilities (under a suitable interpretation of Kolmogorov’s axioms). It is 
argued that the identity thesis is involved in many empiricist versions of the 
propensity interpretation deriving from Popper’s original and influential 
proposal, and is one of the main reasons why such interpretations are untenable. 
As an alternative, a return to Charles Peirce’s insights on probabilistic 
dispositions is recommended, and a reconstructed version of his pragmatist 
conception is offered, which rejects the identity thesis. – Correspondence to: 
msuarez@filos.ucm.es 
 
 
The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Karl Popper in a series of 
epoch-making papers in the late 1950s. However, the more general thought that 
dispositional properties are essentially connected to chance had been voiced earlier:  
Charles Peirce is often credited with the introduction of the main insight as far back as 
                                                
* Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy, February 2013 (submitted 6 June, accepted 
23 November, 2011). For comments I would like to thank the audience at the III 
Graduate Conference in the Philosophy of Probability, London School of Economics 
(June 2010), and Donald Gillies and Alan Hajek. The paper was written during research 
stays at Harvard University and Oxford in 2010-11. At Harvard I thank the Philosophy 
Department for sponsorship; at Oxford, I thank the Bodleain Library. Financial support 
is acknowledged from the Spanish Government research grants FFI2008-06418-C03-01, 
FFI2011-29834-C03-01 and PR2010-0066.     
1892. One of my claims in this paper is that there are substantial differences in the 
spirit, as well as the details, of Popper’s and Peirce’s accounts – and that these 
differences matter in the evaluation of some contemporary claims and arguments in the 
philosophy of probability. Their accounts may be referred to as the ‘empiricist’ and 
‘pragmatist’ conceptions of propensity respectively, 1 and in this paper I argue for a 
reconstructed version of the pragmatist conception. 
 
When it comes to probability, the empiricist tradition has traditionally favored the 
frequency interpretation as formulated by Reichenbach and Von Mises. 2 On this view 
probability is in some sense an extension of the concept of statistical association or 
correlation among observable quantities. More precisely, probability is identified with 
the ratio or frequency of favourable to total outcomes in a sequence of results of a 
repeated chance experiment. The sequences are defined with respect to some particular 
reference class – or “collective” in Von Mises terminology. The view is supposedly in 
line with a Humean understanding of laws as regularities, and more particularly of 
probabilistic laws as statistical regularities. 
 
By contrast, Popper’s introduction of the propensity interpretation may prima facie 
appear to be a nonempiricist, or even metaphysical, retort to the frequency 
interpretation. Certainly, Popper was not an empiricist in any traditional sense. He was 
                                                
1 There are empiricist and pragmatist elements in both Peirce’s and Popper’s 
philosophies of probability. It is moreover arguable that their overall philosophies of 
science – their scientific methodologies in particular - are very close in many respects. 
But the labels capture well the relative differences between their respective views on 
probability, and fittingly convey the fundamental difference in their spirit. 
2 Hans Reichenbach, The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and 
Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1935/49). Richard Von Mises, Probability, Statistics and Truth (New 
York: Dover, 1957). 
neither an inductivist nor a verificationist. He did not think the content of scientific 
knowledge extends only as far as our knowledge of the empirical or phenomenological 
realm. He liked instead to describe himself as a critical rationalist. He was convinced 
that metaphysical speculation was an important part of the creative process that 
generates scientific conjectures. And he was not opposed to the postulation of 
ontological entities as part of scientific explanations and theories.  
 
The main defect that Popper identified in the frequency interpretation is related to its 
insurmountable difficulties in accounting for single-case probabilities, which Popper 
thought were necessary for quantum mechanics. Suppose we carry out a chance 
experiment on a system only once (for example, tossing a coin). An outcome event is 
produced (for example, heads), but there is then no well-defined reference class or 
collective with respect to which we may define a sequence; and there is thus no 
frequency within a sequence that we may identify the probability of the event with. So, 
on a frequency interpretation, the probability of a single event is meaningless or 
undefined. 
 
The propensity interpretation solves this problem simply by postulating the existence of 
a propensity (e.g. a ½ propensity to heads) that is well defined and meaningful 
independently of any collective. The move to postulate “propensities” over and above 
any features of any sequences is strikingly in violation of the spirit of Humeanism, since 
it blocks the possibility of a reduction of probabilities to frequencies. Not surprisingly 
Humeans roundly reject propensities. 
 
The conflict between propensities and Humeanism is sometimes mistakenly thought to 
extend to all forms of empiricism. Contemporary versions of the propensity 
interpretation make it clear that this extension is illegitimate. In particular Donald 
Gillies has developed his propensity interpretation in the context of a broad empiricist 
methodology. 3 And indeed in a wide-enough sense of the word Popper too was an 
empiricist. He defended the primacy of the scientific method and its rationality. And he 
took the empirical sciences to be primarily characterised by their close connection to 
empirical evidence. The testing of hypotheses in particular was a key and essential part 
of the scientific method. His critical engagement with Vienna Circle logical empiricism 
is very much at the heart of his philosophical development, as he continued to quarrel 
and debate with their ideas and those of their disciples throughout his life. 4 Given this 
critical engagement it cannot be surprising that some elements of their empiricism crept 
into aspects of Popper’s philosophy, including his philosophy of probability. One of 
these elements in particular, I argue, makes it legitimate to refer to Popper’s propensity 
interpretation as “empiricist”. 
 
By contrast, Peirce’s views on chance were not prompted by any physical theory, or any 
particular empirical findings. He was instead led to dispositional notions by his 
acquaintance and practical engagement with techniques of statistical inference in 
geology and astronomy. 5 His approach was pragmatist in a broad sense that accords to 
                                                
3 Donald Gillies, Philosophical Theories of Probability (London: Routledge, 2000b). 
4 For an account, see Victor Kraft “Popper and the Vienna Circle”, in Philip A. Schilpp 
(ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle Illinois: Open Court, 1974), pp. 185-
204, which suitably emphasises Popper’s empiricism. 
5 Peirce’s work as an employee of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey is well 
documented – see Victor F. Lenzen, “Charles S. Peirce as Astronomer”, in Edward C. 
Moore and Richard Robin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce 
(Armherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), pp. 33-50, and Ian 
his own philosophy: he did not reject ontological postulates as long as they exhibited 
explanatory power, and he thought inference to the best explanation may well ground 
theoretical dispositional properties. He moreover worked hard to understand the 
practical consequences or manifestations of probabilistic dispositions, and made an 
effort to figure out what difference chance ascriptions actually make in practice.  
 
Section 1 reviews Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability and identifies a 
residual empiricist commitment – which I call the identity thesis. Sections 2 and 3 
review Peirce’s notion of probabilistic dispositional property in the context of his 
pragmatist philosophy. Section 4 argues for an updated version of the ‘pragmatist’ 
conception that rejects the identity thesis. Then in section 5 I turn to the contemporary 
debate by considering in detail a fundamental objection to the propensity interpretation 
of probability due to Paul Humphreys. Section 6 discusses some of the standard moves 
in response to Humphreys’ ‘paradox’. I argue that the identity thesis is the key to all of 
them, since it is a covert assumption in the formulation of the paradox itself. Section 7 
develops the pragmatist conception in response to Humphreys’ paradox. Section 8 
concludes by defending the pragmatist conception against the most sophisticated 
empiricist account nowadays available.  
 
1. Popper’s Empiricist Propensity Interpretation 
 
For our present purposes four elements in Popper’s propensity interpretation stand out. 
First, in spite of Popper’s occasional use of the word “theory”, his proposal is to provide 
                                                                                                                                          
Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
chapter 23. 
an interpretation of the probability calculus. 6 Early on in his career, Popper considered 
alternative axiomatic systems, and even developed one of his own. 7 But by the time he 
developed his propensity views in the 1950’s and 1960’s, Kolmogorov’s axioms were 
established. Thus Popper’s application of propensity to probability was circumscribed 
by these. Second, Popper’s interpretation is what I will call a relational one: it 
postulates propensities as properties of entire experimental set ups, not individual 
systems. On such views it makes no sense to suppose that an object in a single-object 
universe, with no further experimental apparatus, possesses any propensities. Popper 
writes: “A statement about propensity may be compared with a statement about the 
strength of an electric field […] and just as we can consider the field as physically real, 
so we can consider the propensities as physically real. They are relational properties of 
the experimental set-up.” 8 
 
A third element is indeed Popper’s empirical realism concerning propensities. Popper 
emphasised how propensities are part of empirical reality just like forces and masses are 
part of the empirical reality described by Newtonian mechanics. Propensities are hence 
neither fictional nor hypothetical: Their existence is certainly testable, and Popper 
thought that it had in fact been tested. 9 
 
                                                
6 ‘Interpretation’ is taken in this paper in its most common usage in analytical 
philosophy – as a ‘model’, and therefore an account of the nature of something. To 
interpret x is to provide a model m for x – where m tells us what x really is.  
7 Karl Popper, “A Set of Independent Axioms for Probability”, Mind, XLVII, pp. 275-
277. 
8 Karl Popper, “The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of Probability, and the 
Quantum Theory” in Stephan Körner (ed.), Observation and Interpretation in the 
Philosophy of Physics (New York: Dover, 1957), pp. 65-70. 
9 By interference experiments in quantum mechanics – see Karl Popper, “The 
Propensity Interpretation of Probability”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 
37 (1959), p. 28; and Karl Popper, Quantum Theory and Schism in Physics (London: 
Hutchinson, 1982), pp. 83-84. 
The fourth and final element is the adoption by Popper of a long-run version of the 
propensity interpretation, as opposed to a single-case version. 10 We may distinguish 
these views as follows.  All propensity theories postulate dispositional properties that 
yield the appropriate empirical frequencies observed in experimental trials conducted on 
suitable chance set-ups. A propensity then, like any other dispositional property, 
manifests itself in the display of another distinct property, and this is true both in the 
long-run and single-case views. However, the nature of the manifestation property 
differs fundamentally on both views. A long-run view assumes that a propensity is a 
property of something like a repeatable sequence of experimental trials. So it may only 
manifest itself as a frequency in the sequence of outcomes of a series of experimental 
trials in the long run. A single-case view, on the other hand, assumes that the propensity 
is a property of a single trial and thus may manifest itself fully in that very trial. The 
former manifestation property belongs to the long-run sequence, while the latter is a 
property of the single trial. 
 
The long-run view may be characterised as follows: A propensity to a particular 
outcome is a probability, corresponding to a distribution over the possible outcomes of 
an experimental chance set up, and giving rise to a frequency when the experiment is 
often repeated. 11 To give a routine example: Suppose that I toss a coin, which I know to 
                                                
10 There is some debate over the nature of Popper’s interpretation at this point. His 
insistence on applying propensities to the single case often makes it sound as if he 
adopts a single-case interpretation. But in developing the details of the account he links 
propensities to repeatable conditions – something seemingly incompatible with a single-
case theory. Later on in life he seems to have recognised this, and some authors even 
distinguish an “earlier” and a “later” Popper – e.g. Donald Gillies, op. cit. (2000b), pp. 
126-29.  
11 I am at this point reformulating Donald Gillies’ characterisations slightly in order to 
avoid their ambiguity over the distinction between what I call ‘objectual’ and 
‘relational’ dispositions (cf. the definitions in Gillies, op. cit. (2000b), p. 126 and p. 131, 
for illustrations of the ambiguity). 
be fair. Its probability of landing heads is ½. On Popper’s propensity interpretation, this 
probability is a dispositional property of the generating conditions, or experimental 
setup, and it gives rise to a 50-50 frequency when the experiment is repeated infinitely. 
In the long-run version of this interpretation, contrary to what happens in the single-case 
version, the frequency is the property that displays the propensity; and there is no need 
to invoke any further entities or properties of the single trial.  
 
The empiricist component in Popper’s propensity interpretation is then best summarised 
in what we may call the Identity Thesis: the view that propensities are probabilities 
(under the appropriate interpretation of the probability calculus). This is an empiricist 
thesis in the sense that it links by definition an abstract explanatory concept 
(“propensity”) to a more concrete concept in empirical science (“probability”). This 
empiricist commitment is expressed in two of the aspects of Popper’s proposal 
discussed above. First, there is the insistence on propensities as interpretations of 
probabilities. That is, Popper is not postulating a set of distinct new entities over and 
above probabilities; he is rather providing a theory of probabilities as propensities. 
Second, there is the emphasis on considering these probabilities, so interpreted, as part 
of empirical reality, and thus subject to the same standards of confirmation as forces, 
masses or the like. Propensity ascriptions are, for Popper, testable in just the same way 
any other empirical conjectures are. Every empirical refutation of a statistical law 
vindicates their empirical character. There is therefore a legitimate sense in which 
Popper’s propensity interpretation may be said to be ‘empiricist’. 
 
2. Peirce’s Chances 
 
Charles Peirce is among those credited with first introducing the notion of absolute 
chance, or irreducible metaphysical indeterminism. His views on dispositional 
probabilities track those on absolute chance, and may even have preceded them. 12 What 
has not been sufficiently appreciated is how Peirce’s philosophy of probability is in line 
with his general pragmatism – or ‘pragmaticism’ as he used to call it. It is standard 
nowadays to refer to any theory of probabilistic dispositions as a ‘propensity’ theory. 
Peirce never used the term ‘propensity’, and it would be anachronistic to ascribe it to 
him; but it may help us to compare Peirce’s view to other contemporary ‘propensity’ 
theories. Indeed Peirce’s propensities possess four distinguishing features; they are 
‘objectual’, ‘causal’, ‘hypothetical’, and ‘long run’.  
 
Let me begin by quoting two well-known paragraphs in Peirce’s writings:  
 
“[…  ] The die has a certain ‘would-be’; and to say that a die has a ‘would-be’ is to 
say that it has a property, quite analogous to any habit that a man might have. […] 
And just as it would be necessary, in order to define a man’s habit, to describe how 
it would lead him to behave and upon what sort of occasion – albeit this statement 
would by no means imply that the habit consists in that action – so to define the 
die’s ‘would-be’ it is necessary to say how it would lead the die to behave on an 
occasion that would bring out the full consequence of the ‘would-be’; and this 
statement will not of itself imply that the ‘would-be’ of the die consists in such 
behavior.” 
  
                                                
12 As well as his logic of statistical inference – see Ian Hacking (op. cit., pp. 207-210). 
“Now in order that the full effect of the die’s ‘would-be’ may find expression, it is 
necessary that the die should undergo an endless series of throws from the dice box, 
the result of no throw having the slightest influence upon the result of any other 
throw, or, as we express it, the throws must be independent each of every other.” 13 
 
Together these two paragraphs express at least three of the four main features of 
Peirce’s ‘propensities’. First, notice that Peirce ascribes the propensity (the ‘would-be’ 
property) to the die itself, taken in isolation. In other words, Peirce holds an ‘objectual’ 
view that ascribes propensities to the chancy objects themselves. While this might at 
first sight appear trivial, it is as a matter of fact very unusual nowadays, for at least two 
reasons. The first reason is that contemporary theories typically ascribe propensities to 
events and not objects. (In the next section I argue that contemporary theories tend to 
identify propensities and probabilities, which means that to be coherent they must 
ascribe propensities to the elements of a sigma field, that is, events or propositions). The 
second reason is that the usual assumption nowadays is to ascribe dispositional 
properties to the entire experimental set up, which includes the chancy object but also a 
number of further entities and their properties too including, possibly, on some 
accounts, the state of the whole universe at a given time. However, these are arguably 
grand metaphysical departures from the common-sense or pre-philosophical view. For 
what is usual in common parlance in everyday life is to ascribe chance to the chancy 
object itself just as Peirce does. (A few examples: “this coin’s chance of landing heads”, 
“Arsenal’s chance to win the Champions’ League this year”, “given this material’s 
chance to radioactively decay in the next hour”). Peirce’s ‘objectualism’ is thus 
grounded upon common dispositional parlance; it is the subsequent propensity theories 
                                                
13 Charles S. Peirce, “Note on the Doctrine of Chances” (1910), in Philosophical 
Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover, 1955), p. 169. 
(including Popper’s) which seem intriguingly at odds with the ordinary linguistic 
practice. 
 
Second, Peirce’s “propensities” are causal in the sense that he does not refrain from 
ascribing causal powers to chances. Notice in this regard the following locutions as 
applied to propensities in the quoted excerpts: they ‘lead’ [to a certain behaviour], and 
they have ‘full consequences’ that are ‘brought out’ on particular occasions. Peirce was 
clear in his writings about the nature of causation in general, which he thought of in 
terms of Aristotle’s efficient causation, and distinguished carefully from the other three 
Aristotelian notions of causation, from Kant’s notion of causation as the instantaneous 
determination of states, and from Hume’s notion of causation as constant conjunction. 14 
He then went on to explicitly link chances’ powers to efficient causation. 15  
 
The ‘hypothetical’ character of Peirce’s propensities is not explicit but it may be elicited 
from these paragraphs. Consider in particular Peirce’s close analogy, in the quote given, 
between objective chances and human habits. Unlike other prima facie categorical 
properties of human beings, such as height or weight, habits are not susceptible to 
observation, measurement or perception through the senses. Our knowledge of such 
properties is rather the result of inference from testimony and observed behaviour. They 
tend to appear not in description of behaviour, but in its explanation and justification, as 
well as other self-vindicating practices. And just as habits are invoked in the 
explanation and justification of behaviour, chances are invoked in the explanation and 
                                                
14 Charles S. Peirce “Causation and Force” (1898), in Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, vol. VI: Scientific Metaphysics, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul 
Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), pp. 46 – 87. 
15 Charles S. Peirce “Reply to the Necessitarians” (1893), in op. cit. (1935), appendix A, 
pp. 403ff. 
justification of phenomena. In drawing a close analogy between habits and propensities, 
Peirce implicitly suggests that ‘propensities’ may be regarded as theoretical explanatory 
properties arrived at by the ‘method of hypothesis’.  
 
The second quoted paragraph also expresses Peirce’s commitment to what is nowadays 
known as a ‘long-run’ propensity view. While avoiding empiricist strictures, Peirce’s 
pragmatism compels him nonetheless to consider what difference propensity ascriptions 
would make in practice. And he finds that the full consequences of propensities can 
only be revealed in a long-run (virtual and infinite) sequence of experimental trials of 
the same kind. In more contemporary terms, propensities manifest themselves in the 
appropriate repeatable experiments as virtual or hypothetical limiting frequencies. 
 
3. Maxims of Pragmatism 
 
In this paper I argue for a reconstructed version of Peirce’s view on probabilistic 
dispositions. Although my account differs from Peirce’s original view in a number of 
respects, it is nonetheless squarely in Peirce’s pragmatist tradition. In fact I claim that 
the most significant point of difference with Peirce actually serves to further advance 
the aims of pragmatism. Moreover, the contrast with Popper’s ‘empiricist’ view 
becomes clearest against the background of a general pragmatist philosophy of science. 
So in this section I expound on this philosophical framework, by characterising it as 
clearly as possible, however tentatively, in terms of five maxims. We may refer to them 
collectively as the maxims of pragmatism, although strictly speaking only the first one 
was ever known under such a name. The remaining four, expressed here in the form of 
negative commands, are meant as succinct expressions of recurrent themes throughout 
the history of pragmatism that have gained relevance in the light of subsequent 
philosophical developments. As foil and way of contrast I also deploy different theses 
from various empiricist traditions – in a brief summary form – indicating its provenance 
in each case. Such presentation is anachronistic, but it has the analytical virtue to bring 
into relief the key distinguishing features of these philosophical approaches to 
propensities. It does not aim at historical or exegetical accuracy, but rather to abstract 
away from unnecessary detail.  
 
Maxim one (the pragmatist maxim): Do refer your concept of any object to what 
you conceive to be that object’s effects, or practical consequences. 
 
Peirce stated the pragmatist maxim in several different forms and with different 
emphases throughout his life. 16 In particular he seems to have slightly modified the 
relative importance he attached to ‘practical consequences’ as opposed to merely effects 
of the object. The one aspect that seems to have remained constant throughout was the 
emphasis on ‘conceivability’: The concept of the object is only exhausted by its full set 
of conceivable effects. In other words, the pragmatist maxim applies to all objects, 
whether actual, possible, or merely imaginary. And it defines any such object in terms 
                                                
16 Charles S. Peirce, “How to make our ideas clear” (1878), in Writings of C. S. Peirce: 
A Chronological Edition, edited by M. Fisch (Bloomington: University of Indiana 
Press, 1986), vol. 3, p. 266: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object”. It is 
remarkable that the example that Peirce invokes straightaway is precisely the concept of 
a dispositional property, namely ‘hardness’. The passage continues as follows: “Let us 
illustrate this rule by some examples; and to begin with the simplest one possible, let us 
ask what we mean by calling a thing hard. Evidently that it will not be scratched by 
many other substances. The whole conception of this quality, as of every other, lies in 
its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft 
thing so long as they are not brought to the test”. 
of all its effects, whether actual, possible or merely imaginary – thus including (but not 
restricted to) those effects of the object in the actual world. 
 
The remaining four maxims are compatible with, while not logically following from, 
maxim one. For our purposes they are best expressed negatively, in order to emphasise 
the contrast with empiricism, as follows. 
 
Maxim two: Do not identify hypothetical entities and their properties with their 
empirical manifestations or displays.  
 
The second maxim signals pragmatism’s opposition to two distinct forms of 
empiricism, namely, verificationism and operationalism, at least in their crudest 
versions. The pragmatist rejects the need for a reduction of our abstract concepts to any 
phenomenological basis, such as sense-data, or any set of experiences. He or she instead 
assumes that the entities postulated in scientific theories stand on their own feet and 
require no grounding in empirical data in order to be meaningful. The truth conditions 
of statements regarding such entities and properties are not reducible to those of 
statements regarding their empirical verification or manifestations. Note that maxim two 
is compatible with maxim one. The latter is far more general, containing no reference to 
‘hypothetical’ entities, or ‘empirical’ effects. For example, some of the conceivable 
effects of some of the unobservable entities postulated in scientific theories are 
themselves unobservable. 
 
Maxim three: Do not seek mere analyses or philosophical interpretations of 
scientific concepts, but actively engage with the sciences, by refining, changing or 
adding to their concepts. 
 
Pragmatists regard mere conceptual analysis as an unduly limiting task for philosophy, 
which is moreover underwritten by a mistaken general conception of both the nature of 
knowledge and its acquisition – the so-called spectator conceptions of knowledge. 17 On 
such conceptions philosophy is a distinct meta-discipline that can at best aim to clarify 
some of the concepts employed in the sciences – but it neither disputes them nor 
engages in any critical way with them. The pragmatist tradition, by contrast, has tended 
to see philosophy as continuous with science, engaging in a critical manner with both its 
methods and concepts, and bringing its own specific techniques to bear on scientific 
problems directly. And although philosophy may be able to provide a wider, bird’s eye 
point of view on the state of the diverse sciences, it is not a fundamentally distinct form 
of inquiry.  
 
This maxim opposes pragmatism to two distinct traditions. On the one hand it opposes it 
to the type of ordinary language philosophy that accepts conceptual analysis as the only 
legitimate form of philosophical reflection upon science. On the other hand it opposes 
pragmatism to views of the method and aim of philosophy at odds with those of science. 
The former distinguishes pragmatism from the tradition of conceptual analysis, while 
the latter distinguishes it from an array of methodological empiricisms, including 
Popper’s own. Popper was the most reluctant among classical twentieth-century 
                                                
17 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, in J. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Later 
Works, 1925-1953, vol. 4 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1929), p. 19. 
methodologists to subject his own philosophical proposals to the very methods that they 
postulated for science. Indeed the difficulties in applying Popper’s proposed scientific 
method (‘falsificationism’) to itself are notorious, and the debate over the scientific 
credentials of Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism rages on to this day. 18 
 
Maxim four: Do not attempt to reduce causal efficacy and causation to anything 
empirically accessible, such as frequency or correlation.  
 
Another form of empiricism opposed by pragmatism is Humeanism. Hume proposed to 
banish all metaphysical necessity from our knowledge of the world, and aimed to 
reduce all modalities to correlations or regularities among actual occurrences. Causation 
was one of his main targets, and many exegetical analyses of Hume’s writings on 
causality agree that Hume attempted to reduce causation to contingent features of the 
actual world such as actual constant conjunction or, alternatively, the actual 
psychological habits by which humans come to expect those regularities to persist in 
time. 19 The pragmatist tradition on the whole has eschewed Humeanism along with any 
other attempt to reduce our causal talk to anything else. Peirce, in particular, freely 
employed the language of causes, tendencies, and powers, while not attempting to 
provide any theory that would reduce such concepts to more basic, elementary, or 
empirically accessible ones. Unlike some of their contemporaries in logical positivism, 
                                                
18 See e.g. Robert Nola and Howard Sankey, Theories of Scientific Method (London: 
Acumen, 2007).  
19 Thus following, roughly, Hume’s two definitions of cause in the Treatise (David 
Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1739 / 1978), p. 
77, and p. 170; see Robert Fogelin, Hume’s Skepticism ain the Treatise of Human 
Nature (London: Routledge, 1985), chapter IV for discussion). Galen Strawson refers to 
the first form of reduction as “the standard view” in the exegesis of Hume’s views on 
causation (in The Secret Connection: Causation, Realism and David Hume (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. vii).  
logical empiricism or logical atomism, the pragmatists were not at any stage inclined 
towards a foundationalist epistemology seeking to ground our knowledge of the external 
world upon the ‘secure’ foundations of the senses. The pragmatist conception of 
experience is notably wider than the empiricist one, and it crucially does not assume 
that a definite gradient of epistemic ‘security’ or ‘certainty’ attaches to claims 
exclusively reporting the content of our perceptions. 20 As with maxim two, notice that 
the denial of maxim four fails to follow from maxim one, which is more generally 
applied to all our concepts, and does not mark out an ‘empirically accessible’ basis for 
any reduction. For example, the practical consequences, or effects, of causes may well 
include further causes.  
 
Maxim five: Do not systematically reject as unacceptable those scientific theories 
that postulate hypothetical or fictional entities. 
 
Peirce was instrumental in establishing the common view nowadays that the sciences 
progress by means of ampliative forms of reasoning going well beyond inductive or 
deductive inference. Abduction, or the method of hypothesis, was outstanding among 
them; and under the name ‘inference to the best explanation’ it is at the centre of 
present-day debates over scientific realism. It is unclear whether Peirce demanded that 
theories arrived at by means of these ampliative leaps of reasoning should be true, at 
                                                
20 This is at any rate the spirit that notably underwrites Quine’s critique of Carnap’s 
notion of analyticity (“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), 
pp. 20-43); Sellar’s critique of the myth of the given (“Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind” in Herbert Feigls and Michael Scriven (eds.), The Foundations of Science and 
the Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); and Neurath’s critique of foundationalist 
epistemology (Otto Neurath, “Protocol Statements” in Robert Cohen and Marie Neurath 
(eds.), Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1932 / 1983). 
least in the long term of ideal inquiry. He is certainly often interpreted that way. 21 At 
any rate, regardless of the merits of this interpretation, Peirce did not think that only a 
true theory is acceptable now or, indeed, at any (finite) stage in the development of 
science. On the contrary, for Peirce scientific theories postulating hypothetical or 
fictional entities are acceptable as long as they are explanatory – and explanatory power 
is at best a fallible guide to truth. Such theories may only, if anything, be rejected in the 
long term of an ideally conducted inquiry. Hence for a pragmatist the introduction of a 
fictional or hypothetical entity as part of a scientific theory or model may be justified on 
ampliative explanatory grounds. By contrast the empiricist only has to hand the tools of 
deductive or inductive reasoning in order to justify such postulates. Strict empiricists 
would reject fictional or hypothetical entities since they have not been derived from our 
secure perceptual knowledge by inductive means. And in Popperian methodology, the 
postulate of a new type of entity must at least in principle be empirically testable, for the 
scientific theory that introduces such an entity must be falsifiable. Neither is able to 
otherwise countenance the postulation of explanatory entities arrived at by the method 
of hypothesis. 
 
4. Propensity: A Pragmatist Conception 
 
In this section I explicitly compare Peirce’s and Popper’s views with respect to the five 
maxims of pragmatism described in the last section. The conclusion will be that the four 
features discussed of Peirce’s dispositional probabilities are in agreement with the 
pragmatist maxims, while at least one important feature of Popper’s propensities is not. 
                                                
21 Hilary Putnam, in Reason, Truth and History (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
1981), and Christopher Hookway, in Peirce (London: Routledge, 1985), interpret Peirce 
as entertaining a regulative-ideal conception of inquiry and, correspondingly, of 
scientific truth. 
 The key idea is related to the distinction between long-run and single-case versions of 
the propensity theory. As was noticed, the ‘long-run’ version requires a bipartite 
distinction between frequencies, on the one hand, and propensities on the other. The 
identity thesis then interprets probabilities as propensities, so the propensity theory is 
then regarded as an elucidation of what the concept of (objective) probability amounts 
to. The idea is that objective probabilities are somehow connected with dispositional 
properties – but how exactly? The contemporary theory of dispositional properties 
distinguishes appropriately between the possession and manifestation conditions of a 
disposition. We may think of dispositions as the underlying properties defined by the 
possession conditions; there must in addition be some manifestation property defined by 
the manifestation conditions. 22 It is natural then to think of propensities as the 
underlying dispositional properties of things with frequencies as their empirical 
manifestations. The coin’s ½ chance is manifested in the long-run infinite virtual 
sequence of experimental trials of tossing coins. It is only in this long-run infinite 
virtual sequence that we may expect the relative ratio of heads and tails to be one. It 
follows that – as Peirce thought – the difference that a propensity ascription can make in 
practice can only be ascertained in a hypothetical long run of the experiment. (And, in 
fact, in the infinite long run since, as is well known, any finite relative frequency is 
compatible with any value in the ascription of a propensity).  This must mean that for 
Peirce the practical consequences of a propensity ascription are as hypothetical as the 
propensity itself. 
 
                                                
22 Stephen Mumford, Dispositions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). In the 
typical example “fragile” is the dispositional property, and “breakage” is its 
manifestation. 
It follows that Peirce did not hold the identity thesis. His aim could not have been to 
explicate, in Carnap’s sense of the term, the concept of probability, as formally 
expressed by Kolmogorov. This is a project that he would not have even comprehended. 
He neither had to hand a particular formalization of the concept, nor did he share in the 
project of ‘explicating’ scientific concepts. We cannot seriously ascribe to him the 
empiricist commitment to replace a theoretical notion with an empirically accessible 
one. His diatribes against Hume on this particular matter are unambiguous. 23 And the 
fact that, as we just saw, he took both propensities and their manifestations to be 
hypothetical is at odds with any empiricist account of these notions. What Peirce was 
rather aiming for was a development of a causal understanding of chance and its 
practical consequences for doing science. He thought the concept of chance, so 
understood, was an integral part of the activity of scientists everywhere. He took it to be 
exemplified in most experimental physics, and in particular in statistical physics, and he 
was a pioneer in developing some of the first statistical models of the analysis of data, 
such as randomisation. And although he could not have anticipated the quantum 
revolution, this is an understanding that fits later developments in physics as well.  
 
The four elements that I have emphasised in Peirce’s conception of propensity 
(‘objectual’, ‘causal’, ‘hypothetical’, ‘long run’) agree to some degree with the maxims 
of pragmatism. More specifically, maxim two is in line with the ‘objectual’ character of 
Peirce’s would-be’s, maxim four with their ‘causal’ nature, and maxim five with their 
being ‘hypothetical’. Maxim three resonates with all the features of Peirce’s 
                                                
23 See for instance the debate with Dr. Carus in Charles Peirce, “Reply to the 
Necessitarians”, op. cit. (1893 / 1935), appendix A, particularly pp. 414-16. Peirce is 
generally a fierce critic of many aspects of Hume’s empiricism but the tone of his 
criticism is most poignant when addressing Hume’s scepticism towards the reality of 
chances and causality. 
dispositional probabilities. Peirce was initially led to the frequency view of probability, 
and afterwards to the ‘long-run’ version of the propensity view by pragmatist intuitions. 
24 In most respects, his developing views on chance reflect his commitments in 
pragmatism, and vice-versa: his pragmatism developed in response to his commitment 
to, and acquaintance with, the reality of chance. Nevertheless Peirce lacked a full 
understanding of the difference between a statistical feature of an ensemble and the 
genuinely stochastic behaviour of an individual system. He did not benefit from a fully 
developed stochastic dynamical theory for any of the phenomena that he was acquainted 
with. He thus mistook the commitment to a ‘long-run’ version for a commitment to 
chance simpliciter, and he could hardly have anticipated this element in his theory to be 
furthest from the pragmatist maxims, including maxim one. 
 
For suppose that our concept of propensity is exhausted by its conceivable effects 
(including the ‘practical consequences’ of these effects), as maxim one requires. And 
suppose moreover that our concept is ‘long-run’: X has propensity P in experiment E if 
and only if were E repeated an infinite number of times, the relative frequency of X in 
the infinite sequence of outcomes of E so generated would be P. What are the practical 
consequences, or effects, of an ascription of propensity such as this? I already noted that 
their practical consequences are hypothetical – they are what we would be able to infer 
from the result of repeating the experiment an infinite number of times. So, on this 
combination of views, a probability ascription to a single case (to an experiment that 
can only be performed once) has no meaning. For the effects of the ascription are as a 
matter of principle not available to us, in any short-enough run, and we are not able to 
                                                
24 Arthur Burks (in his “Peirce’s Two Theories of Probability”, in Edward C. Moore and 
Richard S. Robin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce (Armherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), pp. 141-150) appropriately links Peirce’s 
development of propensities to the pragmatist maxim. 
conceive them. Since no statement of which we cannot conceive its effects has meaning, 
the statement that a particular event x in isolation has probability P also has no meaning. 
There is on his view of chance no coherent concept of single case probability. 
 
Yet, single-case probability ascriptions are not meaningless, and may well have 
practical consequences, even dramatic consequences – not only in science but in 
everyday life. 25 This entails that one among our commitments is mistaken, and indeed 
Peirce seems to have struggled with the tension throughout his life. He was led to a 
succession of modifications of the pragmatist maxim one with an aim to develop an 
analysis of practical consequence that would make sense in the long run. But his 
defence of the indefinite nature of our social commitments within ideally extended 
communities is both vague and unfeasible for a complete understanding of probability. 
His aims would have been better served by a single case version of the propensity 
theory, which would have resolved the tension, since it is simpler to stick to maxim one 
by relinquishing the commitment to the ‘long run’. 26 
 
Recall what the single-case version entails: Propensities do not manifest themselves as 
frequencies in infinite virtual sequences, but as probabilities in every single 
                                                
25 Peirce was acutely aware of the problem himself: “Yet, if a man had to choose 
between drawing a card from a pack containing twenty five red cards and a black one, 
or from a pack containing twenty-five black cards and a red one, and if the drawing of a 
red card were destined to transport him to eternal felicity, and that of a black one to 
consign him to everlasting woe, it would be folly to deny that he ought to prefer the 
pack containing the larger proportion of red cards, although from the nature of the risk, 
it could not be repeated. It is not easy to reconcile this with our analysis of the 
conception of chance”. Charles Peirce, “The Doctrine of Chances”, op. cit. (1878 / 
1986), p. 282. 
26 The diagnosis is not new – and neither is the prescription for pragmatism to abandon 
the long-run view – see particularly James Fetzer, “Peirce and Propensities”, in E. C. 
Moore (ed.), Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: 
The University of Alabama Press, 1993), pp. 60-71. 
experimental trial. This demands a tripartite distinction between the dispositional 
property of the system (the propensity), its manifestation or effect in each single trial 
(the probability) and the consequences in the long run of the experiment (the 
frequency). It is certainly true that the probability that is displayed in every 
experimental trial is not observable or verifiable in the sense required by empiricists – 
but then neither propensities nor frequencies are observable or verifiable in this sense on 
any propensity view, including Peirce’s. Yet there is a considerable gain in explanatory 
power. The long-run view can not bring propensities to bear explanatorily on the single 
case – no result of a single experimental trial is ever ‘explained’ in its own terms. The 
single-case view, by contrast, explains every single trial as the exercise of the 
underlying disposition, which displays itself in a probability. This explanatory 
advantage reveals itself fully in the explanation of the sort of genuinely and irreducibly 
indeterministic phenomena that Peirce presciently understood to be universal – and 
which is best exemplified by atomic phenomena, such as radioactivity. On a long-run 
view nothing explains the actual decay of a particular piece of radioactive material – we 
may only explain the hypothetical decay of an infinite number of similar samples of the 
material under similar conditions. On the single-case view developed here the actual 
decay observed is adequately explained by the propensity invoked (the element’s ‘half-
life’) and its display in the appropriate probability of decay within a given period of 
time. 
 
To summarize, the conception of propensity defended in this paper is i) objectual, ii) 
causal, iii) hypothetical, and iv) single case. It differs maximally from Popper’s, which 
is arguably none of these, and minimally from Peirce’s, which is definitely i)-iii) but not 
iv). It is moreover arguable that the move from a long-run view to a single-case view 
can be justified by the very pragmatism that led Peirce to the development of his 
original view in the first place. And, in addition, the conception defended here rejects a 
central thesis of later conceptions, including Popper’s, namely, the identity thesis. These 
are all powerful reasons why the label ‘pragmatist’ is most apt for the conception of 
propensity defended in this paper. 
 
5. Humphreys’ Paradox 
 
The most formidable objection to the propensity interpretation is due to Paul 
Humphreys and was first recorded in print in 1979 by Wesley Salmon. 27 After a 
discussion of the relative merits of Reichenbach’s frequency interpretation when 
applied to causal sequences, he writes:  
 
“As Paul W. Humphreys has pointed out in a private communication, there is an 
important limitation upon identifying propensities with probabilities, for we do 
not seem to have propensities to match up with “inverse” probabilities. Given 
suitable “direct” probabilities we can, for example, use Bayes’s theorem to 
compute the probability of a particular cause of death. Suppose we are given a set 
of probabilities from which we can deduce that the probability that a certain 
person died as a result of being shot through the head is ¾. It would be strange, 
under these circumstances, to say that this corpse has a propensity (tendency?) of 
                                                
27 In his long review of D. H. Mellor’s first book: Wesley Salmon, “Propensities: A 
Discussion Review”, Erkenntnis, 14, (1979), pp. 183-216. I will follow the entrenched 
use and denote the objection as “HP” for Humphreys’ Paradox. The term is arguably 
inappropriate – it is not so much of a logical paradox as a powerful argument against 
propensity analyses of probability.  
¾ to have had its skull perforated by a bullet. Propensity […] seems to inherit the 
temporal asymmetry of causation.” 28 
 
At this point it may help to distinguish clearly between two different commitments that 
may be run together in the statement of the identity thesis. There is first the commitment 
to interpreting probabilities as propensities (the propensity interpretation of probability 
proper); then there is the commitment to understanding propensities as probabilities. I 
have so far been referring to the latter on its own as the identity thesis, and we may refer 
to it as Identity1. But the full content of the thesis is in fact made up by the conjunction 
of both commitments. Let us refer to such conjunction as Identity2. It follows that the 
identity thesis (Identity2) entails Identity1 but not vice-versa.  
  
Suppose first that propensities are (objective) probabilities, in accordance with Identity1. 
We may refer to this statement as the propensity-to-probability half of the identity 
thesis. Propensities may then be written as Pr and distinguished from the larger class of 
all probabilities P. The question for the full identity thesis (Identity2) is then to elucidate 
for any given probability P (x), whether there is a propensity Pr (x) such that P (x) = Pr 
(x), where the equality sign is crucially taken to denote extensional and not merely 
numerical or quantitative identity. Let us refer to this as the probability-to-propensity 
half of the identity thesis. It is the extensional identity that provides the full content of 
the identity thesis (Identity2), and it is now clear that there are two ways in which it can 
fail. It fails if its propensity-to-probability half (Identity1) fails. But it also fails if its 
probability-to-propensity half fails.  
 
                                                
28 Wesley Salmon, op. cit. (1979), pp. 213-214.  
Note that this is at any rate not how the question is usually framed. I have applied the 
identity thesis here to absolute probabilities, P (x), and absolute propensities, Pr (x), 
when it is typically applied to conditional probabilities and conditional propensities. 
Given any conditional probability P (x / y): is there a corresponding propensity Pr (x / 
y) that it is identical to, and vice-versa? This way of framing the question takes care of 
the fact that many philosophers think that all propensities are conditional, 29 while 
others think that all probabilities are conditional. 30 So I will go along with this 
assumption for the time being. Let us refer to it as assumption one: Propensities are 
(identical with) conditional probabilities. 
 
Different versions of the HP argument address different versions of the identity thesis. 
Thus the simplest examples typically deny the probability-to-propensity half; that is, 
they deny that all probabilities are propensities. Let us for instance consider Salmon’s 
example. We first assume that a particular conditional probability, such as that 
described in Salmon’s example above, is physical and does receive a propensity 
interpretation. We may then denote by s the event type of being shot and by d the event 
type of dying. The probability P (d / s) is then identical to the corresponding propensity 
Pr (d / s), in the sense that there is a propensity interpretation of such a probability – 
which roughly coincides with the capacity that shooting has to kill. Let us refer to this 
as the shooting-to-dying capacity. Humphreys’ paradox then arises when we realise that 
any conditional probability has a well-defined inverse probability, given by the 
application of Bayes’ theorem. If the probability P (d / s) is well defined then so is the 
probability P (s / d). Yet this inverse conditional probability may in no way receive a 
                                                
29 Donald Gillies, op. cit. (2000b), p. 131-2. 
30 Alan Hajek, “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be”, Synthese, 137 (2003), pp. 
273-323. 
propensity interpretation, because, as Salmon notes, there is no corresponding dying-to-
shooting capacity. So Identity2 is false because the last stage in its demonstration above 
fails. The reason for the asymmetry lies with the asymmetry of causation; the events are 
not appropriately listed as cause and effect. While shooting may cause death, it makes 
no sense to suppose that, in the example provided, dying is a cause of shooting. 
 
It must be emphasised that the problem raised by this example does not per se depend 
on the temporal asymmetry between ‘shooting’ on the one hand, and ‘being shot’ – ergo 
dying – on the other. The temporal and causal asymmetries coincide in Salmon’s 
example, but they need not coincide in general. And what prevents the propensity 
interpretation of an inverse conditional probability is the inexistence of a causal relation 
in the direction from the conditioning event to the conditioned event, not any failure in 
the appropriate temporal order. Another example may make this point more forcefully.  
Some friends have remarked on my propensity to fly to North America in the spring. 
Let us denote by ‘F’ the event of my flying to North America, and by ‘S’ the event of 
spring in North America. Both events are extended in time, but ‘F’ is only a few hours 
long, while ‘S’ is three months long. On account of my travelling record over the past 
10 years, we may estimate the probability P (F / S) = 0.9, in line with the past relative 
frequency. Let us then apply Bayes’ theorem: P (S / F) = P (F / S) x P (S) / P (F). The 
prior probability of spring in North America may be calculated by dividing the year into 
four seasons, which yields P (S) = 0.25. On the basis of such a division and the past 
relative frequency of my flights to North America, I can also estimate that P (F) = 0.4.  
We can then work out the inverse probability as P (S / F) = 0.9 x 0.25 / 0.4 = 0.56. This 
is a well-defined probability, but it has no propensity interpretation. The reason is not 
any temporal asymmetry of the events, since spring is an extended event in time that 
can not properly be said to occur before, or for that matter after, my flying to North 
America. The reason is rather that while it makes perfect sense to suppose that Spring in 
north America is one of the factors that cause my decision to fly there, the converse 
would be absurd: my flying to North America does not cause spring there. The reason 
why P (S / T) has no propensity interpretation does not have to do with the time order of 
the conditioning and conditioned events, which in the example just described is 
indeterminate, but is related instead to the causal relation between the events – which is 
certainly determinate in this case. 
 
Thus the propensity interpretation may apply to conditional probability P (y / x) only if 
the conditioning event x is a cause of the conditioned event y. By contrast, whenever it 
is absurd to suppose that x may be a cause of y then P (y / x) has no propensity 
interpretation – regardless of the time order of x, y. Since causality is typically 
asymmetric, y will rarely be among the causes of x whenever x is a cause of y – again, 
regardless of their temporal order. Yet Bayes’ theorem guarantees that if P (y / x) is well 
defined then P (x / y) is also well defined (as long as P (x) ≠ 0). In other words, HP 
shows that there are well-defined conditional probabilities that cannot possibly receive a 
propensity interpretation. Identity2 is therefore false (and nothing so far suggests 
Identity1 to be false in addition). 
 
I have dealt so far with two very simple but intuitive illustrations, one originally due to 
Salmon. Humphreys’ own discussion appeared in print a few years later, 31 and appeals 
to a more sophisticated and complex setup. He considers a source that emits photons 
                                                
31 Paul Humphreys, “Why Propensities can not be Probabilities”, The Philosophical 
Review, 94 (1985), pp. 557-570. See also Paul Humphreys, “Some Considerations on 
Conditional Chances”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55 (2004), pp. 
667-680.  
spontaneously at some time t1; a few among these photons reach a half-silver mirror at a 
certain distance at some later time t2; some may then be absorbed, but most make it 
through and are transmitted at time t3. Let us now, for each photon, denote by Bt1 the 
background conditions at the time t1 of its emission; by It2 the event of its incidence 
upon the mirror, and by Tt3 the event of its transmission through the mirror. Moreover, 
let us suppose, in line with the identity thesis, that propensities are conditional 
probabilities. Humphreys then argues that the physical situation described dictates the 
following values for the propensities at the time of emission: 32 
 
i) Prt1 (Tt3 / It2 & Bt1) = p > 0. 
ii) 1 > Prt1 (It2 / Bt1) = q > 0. 
iii)  Prt1 (Tt3 / ~ It2 & Bt1) = 0. 
 
From the perspective of a single-case propensity theory these statements mean the 
following. Given the background conditions and the emission of a photon at t1, the 
photon has some non-zero propensity to reach the mirror. If the photon reaches the 
mirror, it then has some propensity to be transmitted. Finally, an emitted photon that 
fails to reach the mirror has no propensity (i.e. has propensity zero) to be transmitted. 
 
Now, following Humphreys, 33 consider the following principle of conditional 
independence:  
 
Prt1 (It2 / Tt3 Bt1) = Prt1 (It2 / ~ Tt3 Bt1) = Prt1 (It2 / Bt1).   (CI) 
                                                
32 In Paul Humphreys, op. cit. (2004), p. 669. Humphreys’ original example (op. cit., 
1985, p. 561) assumes that the emission event occurs at an even earlier time, t0. But 
nothing substantial in the argument in the text will depend on the assumption t0 ≠ t1.  
33 Ibid, p. 561; “Some Condierations on Conditional Chances”, p. 669. 
 CI asserts that the propensity of incidence (It2) is independent from transmission at (the 
later) time t3 given the background conditions at (the earlier) time t1. CI seems intuitive, 
but it is unclear exactly why. In particular note that if applied to probabilities rather than 
propensities, CI would just express a screening-off condition, which is notoriously often 
inappropriate when applied to the stages of a probabilistic causal process. Given the 
background conditions, Bt1, why should the probability of incidence It2 be independent 
of Tt3, i.e. of whether the photon is transmitted? On the contrary, it seems that a 
correlation should naturally arise, because the background conditions include also those 
causal factors that make transmission without incidence physically impossible in the 
experiment described – an important issue that I shall return to in section 6. 
 
At any rate, it can be shown that CI, (i), (ii) and (iii) are inconsistent with the 
Kolmogorov axioms of probability. 34 And this entails that the ascriptions of propensity 
values in the experiment described are inconsistent as long as they are required to agree 
with both CI and the probability calculus. The outcome is that not all propensities are 
probabilities, the propensity-to-probability half of the Identity thesis fails, and Identity1 
is shown to be false as well. 
 
The key to the example is CI – why does it seem so intuitive in this case? Humphreys 
endorses the principle fully, and he states that “the conditional independence principle 
CI […] claims that any event that is in the future of It’ leaves the propensity of It’ 
                                                
34 Humphreys (op. cit., 1985), p. 562. The inconsistency with Bayes theorem is 
particularly easy to demonstrate. First, calculate the value of Prt1 (It2 / Tt3 Bt1) by means of 
(i), (ii), (iii) and Bayes theorem. We obtain: Prt1 (It2 / Tt3 Bt1) = Prt1 (Tt3 / It2 Bt1) · Prt1 (It2 / 
Bt1) / Prt1 (Tt3 / Bt1) = p · q / p · q = 1. Then calculate it by means of (ii) and CI: Prt1 (It2 / Tt3 Bt1) 
= Prt1 (It2 / Bt1) = q. Since by definition q < 1, we have a contradiction.  
unchanged; i.e. Prt (It’ / Tt’’) = Prt (It’) [where t < t’ < t’’]. This principle reflects the idea 
that there exists a non-zero propensity at t for It’ to occur, and that this propensity value 
is unaffected by anything that occurs later than It’.” 35 
 
However, on the face of it, this is not what CI actually states. Humphreys is rather 
expressing a more general statement. The idea that is ‘reflected’ in CI is the more 
general one that no propensity at time t is affected by anything that happens after t. CI is 
actually a particular instance of this general idea; it is what results when the general idea 
is applied to the particular example under consideration, and in particular to the 
transmission event Tt3. Since Tt3 lies in the future of It2, the general idea dictates that it 
can not affect the propensity of It2, and this is what CI is formally aiming to express. In 
other words, in referring to CI as the ‘principle of conditional independence’, we seem 
to be committing the fallacy of taking the part for the whole, or the instance for its 
generalisation. The fallacy is innocuous only because what makes CI intuitive is 
precisely the general idea that it is an instance of. So what then is this undeniably 
intuitive general idea? Why should the propensity of an event at time t be ‘unaffected by 
anything that occurs later’?  
 
The discussion in the previous section made it clear that the causal asymmetry between 
a cause a and its effect b – not their temporal order – makes P (b / a) a candidate for a 
(non-zero) propensity. Hence the general idea underlying CI is intuitive under the 
presupposition that causes only act forwards in time. It then follows that no events in 
the future of t’ may causally affect anything that goes on at t’, so the propensity of It’ 
can not be affected by anything that happens at t’’, where t’’ > t’. But notice that there is 
                                                
35 Paul Humphreys, op. cit. (2004), p. 670, my italics. 
nothing peculiar about dispositional properties or propensities at this point: a similar 
statement concerning categorical properties would be just as intuitive. For any 
categorical properties a and b, if a lies in the past of b, and causes only act forwards in 
time, then P (a / b) cannot be other than zero if it is to represent a propensity. By 
contrast, neither statement is intuitive if there is backwards-in-time causation. To see 
this, just carry out the thought experiment: Reject the assumption that backwards 
causation is impossible, and you will see that both the general idea and its instance in CI 
cease to be intuitive. If Tt3 can be considered a backwards-in-time cause of It2 then there 
is no reason whatever why CI should hold for propensities. 
 
Thus the intuition behind Humphreys’ principle of conditional independence (CI) really 
is just the presumed time-asymmetry of causation. We may refer to it as assumption 
two: The conditioning event of a propensity is a (forwards-in-time) cause of the 
conditioned event. The assumption is indeed at the heart of HP, and plays the same key 
role in the simplest examples as well. In Salmon’s shoot-to-kill example, the conditional 
probability P (d / s) may express the conditional propensity of shooting to killing. But 
the inverse conditional probability P (s / d) does not express a corresponding propensity 
of killing to shooting, because d is no cause of s. In the example of my own propensity 
to travel to North America in spring, P (S / F) does not express an inverse conditional 
propensity because F is no cause of S. In both cases it is the violation of assumption two 
that gives rise to the air of paradox – the very assumption that we have shown to be 
involved in the CI principle employed by Humphreys.  
 
6. Some responses to Humphreys’ Paradox 
 
The identity thesis is essentially involved in both assumptions one and two, and in 
section 8 I will suggest that the appropriate response to HP is to reject the thesis 
altogether (and, concomitantly, to reject assumptions one and two). In this section I 
review some of the main alternatives that have been proposed in response to the 
problem raised by HP over the last two decades, and I argue that they implicitly or 
explicitly commit to the identity thesis. 
 
Critical responses to HP in the literature may be classified in two distinct types, 
depending on whether they reject the HP argument as invalid, or accept the argument 
but disagree with Humphreys’ interpretation of its conclusion. Note that regardless of 
what class they fall into, all critical commentators accept that there is a genuine 
contradiction in the example provided between CI and the axioms of classical 
probability theory. The differences rather concern the significance of this contradiction 
– and consequently, the actual conclusion of the HP argument. 
 
Among the first type of responses, McCurdy attempts to show that the HP argument is 
invalid because the example considered does not bear out the principle of conditional 
independence, which he believes to be false in the example given. 36 Indeed it was noted 
in the previous section that CI is likely false if read as a mere statistical screening-off 
condition (note the replacement of propensity functions Pr with probability functions P 
in the following expression): 
 
Pt1 (It2 / Tt3 Bt1) ≠ Pt1 (It2 / ~ Tt3 Bt1) ≠ Pt1 (It2 / Bt1).   (CPD) 
 
                                                
36 Christopher McCurdy, “Humphreys’ Paradox and the Interpretation of Inverse 
Conditional Probabilities”, Synthese, 108, (1996), pp. 105-125. 
We may refer to this inequality as the conditional probabilistic dependence (CPD) 
between the events cited. These events may themselves have many causes, which could 
explain their probabilistic dependence. For instance, McCurdy himself points out that 
there may be common causal factors in the past causal history of both Tt3 and It2. There 
could also be a residual correlation between the exogenous variables that give rise to Tt3 
and It2. Or there may be ‘brute’ probabilistic dependence if the causal processes that 
give rise to Tt3 and It2 are genuinely indeterministic. 
 
However, Humphreys meant conditional independence (CI) to be something other than 
screening-off; otherwise he would not have used propensity functions, Pr, in the 
definition of this condition. As the general principle that gives rise to CI makes clear, CI 
is instead meant to express a form of causal independence characteristic of propensities. 
And CI is true if understood in this way as a sui generis form of causal independence, as 
long as assumptions one and two are maintained. It then makes no sense, in the 
experiment described, to suppose that the propensity of Bt1 to produce It2 depends on 
whether or not Tt3 occurs. (The reason, as already mentioned, is not the temporal order 
of It2 and Tt3 per se, but the asymmetry built into the causal process). 37 
 
Most other authors have endorsed the HP argument and claimed it to be a major 
obstacle, if not definite indictment, for any propensity analysis of probability. The 
differences between these authors are mainly in emphasis and reflect further 
background commitments. Thus Salmon argues that HP should lead us to abandon the 
                                                
37 Nevertheless, as noted already, this form of causal independence carries an implicit 
commitment to those two assumptions, only one of which is causal in nature, namely 
assumption two. Assumption one, by contrast, is representational: it provides a formal 
representation for conditional propensities in the calculus of probability as conditional 
probabilities. Thus we could say that CI is two-faced: it represents both a screening-off 
relation and a characteristic causal relation between propensities and their effects. 
propensity interpretation and embrace instead the frequency interpretation that he 
favors. 38 His argument may be reconstructed as follows: i) there is objective 
probability, or chance; ii) chance requires an interpretation; iii) the only possible 
interpretations of chance are frequencies and propensities; iv) HP shows that the 
propensity interpretation is flawed; hence v) chances ought to be interpreted as 
frequencies. Most commentators see this as an unnecessarily harsh reaction. 39 But 
while other commentators have mainly disputed assumptions i) or iii) in Salmon’s 
argument, I believe that the most problematic assumption is ii). The reason will become 
clearer in the next few sections, but let me briefly anticipate its implications for 
Salmon’s argument. Suppose iii) is true and the objective probabilities can only be 
frequencies or propensities. If so, supposing ii) in addition is tantamount to accepting an 
expanded version of the identity thesis (Identity1), which identifies probabilities with 
either propensities or frequencies. Yet, each of these identifications is flawed or at least 
greatly problematic. 40 Since i) is a prerequisite for any philosophical theory of chance, 
we must reject ii) instead: chance (understood as objective probability) needs no 
interpretation. 41 
 
                                                
38 Wesley Salmon, op. cit. (1979). 
39 For reactions to Salmon’s argument see, for examples, Antony Eagle, “Twenty- one 
Arguments against Propensitiy Analysis of Probability”, Erkenntnis, 60 (2004), p. 407; 
Donald Gillies, “Varieties of Propensity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
(2000a), section 6; and Peter Milne, “Can there be a Realist Single-case Interpretation 
of Probability?”, Erkenntnis, 25 (1986), pp. 129-132.  
40 This paper reviews the case against the identity thesis with respect to propensities. 
For arguments against what is arguably essentially the same thesis but with respect to 
frequencies see e.g. Alan Hájek, “Mises Redux’ – Redux: Fifteen arguments Against 
Finite Frequentism”, Erkenntnis, 45 (1997), pp. 209-227; “Fifteen Arguments Against 
Hypothetical Frequentism”, Erkenntnis, 70 (2009), pp. 211-235; Donald Gillies, op. cit 
(2000b), chapter 5); and D. H. Mellor, Probability: A Philosophical Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 2005), chapter 3. 
41 A referee directed me to a possible antecedent in Isaac Levi’s view that chance 
requires no semantics in The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal 
Probability, and Chance (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1980) chapter 12. 
Milne’s response is similar to Salmon’s, endorsing HP as a fundamental objection to 
propensities. 42 But he goes further than Salmon in claiming that HP shows that the very 
idea of single-case propensity is flawed or incoherent. At first sight this argument may 
appear not to rely on the identity thesis at all. In particular, it appears not to require that 
all (objective) probabilities are propensities. However, it does presuppose the other half 
of the identity thesis, namely, the propensity-to-probability half, since it assumes that all 
propensities are (conditional) probabilities. (In the terminology of this paper, Milne’s 
argument assumes Identity1).  
 
Finally, Humphreys own reaction is in my view the most judicious one. He does not 
think HP gives grounds to reject the concept of propensity, nor does he think it 
constitutes an argument in favour of the frequency interpretation. Instead he claims that 
HP suggests the need to abandon the classical probability-calculus representation of 
propensities as (classical, or Kolmogorov) probabilities, and then asks: “If conditional 
propensities cannot be correctly represented by standard probability theory, what does 
that say about the status of probability theory?” 43 It is unclear exactly how else 
Humphreys intends to represent propensities. He is certainly committed to the identity 
thesis in the derivation of HP, and his response seems to suggest that an alternative 
calculus of probability be developed precisely in order to preserve the identity thesis.  
 
7. Pragmatism and Humphreys’ Paradox 
 
                                                
42 Peter Milne, “Can there be a Realist Single-case Interpretation of Probability?”, 
Erkenntnis, 25 (1986), pp. 129-132. 
43 Paul Humphreys, op. cit. (2004), p. 679. 
The application of the identity thesis to Humphreys’ example is one-way: all 
propensities are understood as probabilities, but it is not required in addition that all 
probabilities be interpreted as propensities. The exceptions may come in three varieties. 
First, the identity thesis already leaves it open that in addition to the physical chances 
that propensities aim to interpret, there may exist personal probabilities or credences. 
Accounting for such probabilities may require a different interpretation – such as the 
subjective or Bayesian interpretation. Second, ever since Kolmogorov wrote, there is an 
entrenched distinction in the literature between absolute and conditional probabilities, 
and it may well be that the propensity interpretation fits one but not the other kind. In 
particular perhaps there are no absolute propensities, and only conditional probabilities 
are interpretable as propensities. 44 Finally, the conclusion of the HP argument makes it 
clear that if a conditional probability has a propensity interpretation, then its inverse – 
which is also a conditional probability – will most likely not have it. So the probability-
to-propensity half of the identity thesis seems incompatible with the assumptions built 
into the HP argument. 
 
However, the propensity-to-probability half of the identity thesis (Identity1) is 
presupposed in the HP argument, where it is introduced by means of assumptions one 
and two. Both assumptions are the offspring of the empiricist instinct to reduce 
problematic theoretical concepts to empirical ones. Assumption one aims to reduce 
propensity to probability, while assumption two aims to reduce it to causation. 
Assumption two in addition implicitly rules out backwards-in-time causation, which has 
been an important part of empiricist thinking ever since Reichenbach’s influential 
                                                
44 This is the view defended by Gillies, op. cit. (2000b), pp. 131-132.  
attempt to reduce the direction of time to open conjunctive forks. 45 In other words, both 
assumptions make full sense in the context of successive empiricist attempts to reduce 
time and propensities to causation, and causation to statistical correlation. Such 
reductionisms have on the whole been alien to the tradition of pragmatism. When they 
have cared for such issues, pragmatists seem to have been happy to accept that the 
direction of time may be primitive, that backwards-in-time causation is conceptually 
possible, and that a cause may leave the probability of its effects unchanged. Certainly, 
in terms of the version of pragmatism reviewed in section 2 of this essay, maxims two 
and four explicitly oppose such reductionism, and seem in open conflict with both 
assumptions. 
 
Let us then consider the possibility that both assumptions are mistaken. Suppose that 
contrary to assumption one propensities are not to be identified with probabilities, and 
in particular may not be appropriately represented as conditional probabilities. But what 
else could propensities be, and how else could they be represented? Here a change of 
paradigm, from an empiricist to a pragmatist framework, may be helpful. Suppose 
following Peirce that propensities are theoretical properties ascribed to objects by 
scientists in an attempt to explain phenomena involving those objects. Propensities are 
on this view not to be identified with probabilities. Instead they are more generally 
taken to be dispositional properties with probabilistic displays or manifestations. There 
is on this view no need to represent the relation between the propensity and its 
manifestations as a conditional probability, or any other probability for that matter. An 
appropriate representational schema would introduce a new symbol » to represent what 
is after all a new and sui generis relation. Let us first consider the case of a deterministic 
                                                
45 Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1954). 
dispositional property. We may then write D » M for “D manifests itself as M”. For 
example, the fragility of a glass may manifest itself in its breakage, so we may write: 
Fragility » Breakage to represent the particular manifestation event, and to distinguish it 
from a breakage that does not display fragility.   
 
A dispositional property is a propensity if it possesses more than one manifestation 
property with some probability. The manifestation event then consists in the display of a 
probability distribution over these properties: D » P (Mi), where Mi are the possible 
manifestation properties. (Alternatively: the manifestation property of a propensity has 
several values, and the propensity displays itself in a probability distribution over these 
values). Thus tossing a fair die (D) has six manifestation properties (M1, M2, … M6), 
and the ‘would-be’ of the die displays itself in a probability distribution over these 
values: D » P (Mi) = 1/6. 
 
Thus we can see that the rejection of assumption one already implies a rejection of the 
identity thesis, in particular its propensity-to-probability half. What about assumption 
two? The pragmatist need not reject upfront that the relation between a propensity and 
its manifestation properties is causal, but can keep a neutral stance instead. It is arguably 
an empirical matter to determine, for any particular propensity, whether it is causally 
related to its manifestations. Similarly for backwards causation: it is an empirical matter 
whether some causes act backwards in time. Hence assumption two is no longer 
required, for three reasons. First, there is no longer an a priori commitment to the causal 
nature of the relation between the propensity and its manifestation. Second, there is no 
commitment to causes preceding their effects. Finally, since we have already disposed 
of assumption one, there is no commitment to the conditional-probability representation 
of effects as events conditioned upon their causes. 
 
Let us now return to Humphreys’ Paradox. The application of the pragmatist conception 
of propensity to the HP argument requires a new representation of Humphreys’ 
experiment and, in particular, of those conditions i-iii) employed to characterise the 
propensities involved.  These propensities are best represented by means of the 
following conditions in the new notation instead: 
 
a) Bt1 & It2 » P (Tt3) = p, where p > 0. 
b) Bt1 » P (It2) = q, where 1 > q > 0. 
c) Bt1 & ~ It2 » P (Tt3) = 0. 
 
Conditions a-c) represent the appropriate propensities of the experiment in terms of the 
events described without any recourse to conditional probability. On the dispositional 
view defended here, these are propensities of the systems involved, perhaps even the 
entire experimental arrangement, at some stage in their temporal evolution. 46 They are 
not strictly speaking properties of the events described on the left hand side of the 
symbol ». But since an event is typically understood as the change in properties of some 
system, we may consider the whole system or systems involved in such a change. We 
may then use the events as shorthand for the description of the dispositional properties 
of the system up to the time of the last event mentioned. So the left hand of the 
                                                
46 David Miller (in Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1994), pp. 183-84) urges that any propensity at time t is implicitly conditional on 
the state of the whole universe at t and so the relevant system turns out to be the whole 
universe. The formulation above is deliberately vague in this regard; different views 
follow from different specifications of what counts as the “system”. Note that this is 
compatible with an ‘objectual’ as opposed to ‘relational’ conception of propensity.  
expressions a), b) and c) describe some change in the properties of the systems that are 
endowed with propensities – and in particular in the particles themselves as they move 
along their trajectories. The right hand side of the expressions describe the 
manifestations or displays of such propensities as probability distributions over the 
values of the relevant manifestation property. 
 
The new representation solves the problem that gave rise to Humphreys’ paradox 
straightaway. There is no contradiction between CI, Bayes’ theorem, and conditions a)-
c) above. The reason is simple, and quite independent of whether or not CI holds. The 
application of CI and Bayes’ theorem to conditions a) – c) has no effect, since the 
probabilities that appear in the right hand sides of those conditions are not conditional 
probabilities. In other words, the problem is shown to be an artefact of the conditional-
probability representation of propensities. 47 
 
8. A Comparison with the Empiricist Alternative 
 
In this section I consider the most outstanding ‘empiricist’ alternative to the 
‘pragmatist’ conception of propensity defended in this paper, namely, Donald Gillies’ 
long-run version of the propensity theory. I argue that this theory also fails to solve 
Humphrey’s paradox since it is ultimately committed to the identity thesis.  
 
                                                
47 There is a sense in which this is line with Humphreys’ own conclusion that 
propensities are ill served by the classical probability-calculus representation (see the 
end of section 6). But Humphreys suggests in response to adopt a different probability 
calculus in order to represent propensities, while I am suggesting that propensities 
cannot be uniformly represented as probabilities, under any calculus, precisely because 
they are distinct from their probabilistic manifestations.  
Gillies’ theory is in many respects very close to Popper’s original ‘earlier’ views. It is a 
long-run theory that takes propensity ascriptions to be testable, just like any statistical 
hypothesis. For Gillies, like Popper, the criterion of testability for propensities is 
essential – thus squarely placing them both in what I have called the “empiricist” 
tradition. In particular what Gillies calls a falsifying rule for probability statements 
(FRPS) is a method to fix a significance level for any statistical hypothesis, which thus 
provides a means to test it, as follows. Consider a statistical hypothesis H and suppose 
we are trying to test H against some evidence, consisting in a sample of n data points 
(e1, e2,…., en). Let X be a test statistic, that is to say a function X (e1, e2,…, en) of the 
observed data whose value can be calculated from the data. Suppose that we can derive 
from the hypothesis H that X ought to have a particularly shaped distribution P (X) – 
call any such P (X) a ‘falsifying distribution’. We can then separate a head and tails part 
to the distribution, as follows: a ≤ X ≤ b. They are such that the probability of obtaining 
a result in the tails is below the significance level, typically set at 5%. Now the 
falsifying rule for probability statements states that “if the value obtained for X is in the 
tails of the distribution, this should be regarded as falsifying H; whereas, if the value of 
X is in the head of the distribution, this should be regarded as corroborating H”. 48 It is 
obvious that this is not strict falsificationism, but a pragmatic form of methodological 
falsificationism instead. 
 
So far Gillies’ theory is simply an empiricist version of a hypothetico-deductive theory 
of confirmation applied to statistical hypotheses. These may be represented by means of 
probability spaces. A probability space is an ordered triple (Ω, F, P), where Ω is the 
sample space, F is the Borel field of subsets of Ω and P is a real-valued function defined 
                                                
48 Donald Gillies, Philosophical Theories of Probability, p, 147. 
on F. These encapsulate Kolmogorov’s axioms, which are expressed by Gillies in terms 
of a single Axiom I: P is a non-negative, countably additive set function on F such that 
P (Ω) = 1.49 Thus in stating that “in the present version of the propensity theory the link 
is established instead by adopting the falsifying rule”, Gillies is in effect committing 
himself to the identity thesis, because the falsifying rule links statistical hypotheses 
(probabilities) to test statistics over the data (frequencies). 
 
But the link between probabilities and frequencies is as a matter of fact not so 
straightforward. It requires an additional axiom, referred to by Gillies as the axiom of 
independent repetitions, 50 which is worth discussing in some detail since it requires an 
expansion of the usual notion of probability space. It first introduces a fourth element 
sui generis for propensities, namely, a sequence of repetitions Ss, which is defined as 
follows. A sequence of events (such as the outcomes of each particular experimental 
trial) is a sequence of repetitions relative to a set of conditions Ss (which include a 
spacing condition s that regularly separates such events in space or time), if all the 
conditions S are satisfied by each event and the events are separated as required by s. 
Gillies then introduces the notion of a probability system, which extends a probability 
space to include sequences of repetitions as follows. (Ss, Ω, F, P) is a probability system 
if (Ω, F, P) is an ordinary probability space and Ω is the set of possible outcomes of the 
repeatable conditions Ss. Suppose that we then select an n-tuple of such repeatable 
conditions a repeated number of times, i. e. a new sequence of repetitions denoted as 
Sns. We may then construct a new probability system considering the n-fold Cartesian 
product of Ω, which we may denote as Ωn. Similarly we let Fn be a Borel field of 
subsets of Ωn defined as the minimum Borel field containing F defined over the 
                                                
49 Gillies, Ibid, p. 160. 
50 Gillies, Ibid, p. 164. 
Cartesian products of the elements of F. The Axiom of Independent Repetitions (axiom 
2) then states that: If (Ss, Ω, F, P) is a probability system, so is (Ss, Ωn, Fn, Pn) for any n, 
where the measure Pn on Fn is the n-fold product measure of the measure P on F.  
 
Gillies then shows that the empirical laws of probabilities follow from axiom I and 
axiom II together with the falsifying rule for probability statements (FRPS). Axiom II is 
interesting in bringing in a further element, the sequences of repetitions Ss. But as far as 
the identity thesis is concerned their introduction does not change matters, since 
sequences of repetitions are not themselves dispositional properties, or propensities, 
distinct from probability distributions. Rather, as we saw, sequences of repetitions are 
sets of events, and typically they are just the outcomes of a particular kind of 
experimental trial (given the spacing condition). Recall that probabilities are defined 
over events or propositions, while propensities (understood as dispositional properties) 
reside in the objects or their properties. So it does not seem prima facie that the 
introduction of sequences of repetitions allows us to introduce propensities as distinct 
from probabilities. Thus Gillies’ theory lacks the resources to evade a commitment to 
the identity thesis and, consequently, to overcome the HP objection. 
 
As an alternative, we may choose to focus upon the experimental systems themselves. 
On Gillies’ view it seems that a particular kind of trial either characterises, or is 
characterised by, the conditions S satisfied by all events in the sequence Ss. The bearers 
of the propensities can then be the objects that make up the experimental apparatus and 
at least partly constitute the set of conditions S, or, alternatively, the conditions 
themselves understood as generalised properties of the whole experimental system. In 
either of these cases, propensities are most definitely not probabilities, since they are not 
borne by those objects that appear in the sigma field over which the relevant probability 
distributions are defined. Their bearing objects in fact appear neither in the probability 
space (Ω, F, P) nor in the expanded probability system that encompasses it, namely, (Ss, 
Ω, F, P). The propensity-to-probability half of the identity thesis would fail on any of 
these interpretations because “propensities” would not be here identified with any 
element within either a probability space or a probability system. There is therefore 
some room to explore ways to get around the HP argument.  
 
However, on reflection, neither of these interpretations can be Gillies’ propensity 
theory. In particular note the following two commitments in Gillies’ theory: i) it is a 
long-run as opposed to a single-case theory, and ii) it is an empiricist theory in the sense 
that propensity claims are supposed to be methodologically falsifiable. As regards i) if 
propensities are properties borne by the experimental apparatus, or the whole 
experimental system, then they are not ‘long-run’, since they obtain, or display 
themselves, in every experimental trial. Gillies’ theory would be indistinguishable from 
a standard single-case theory. As regards ii) on these interpretations propensities are not 
testable in the way that statistical hypotheses are, and the falsifying rule for probability 
statements (FRPS) strictly speaking does not apply to propensities, but only to the 
probability distributions that putatively ensue from them. It would be wrong on any of 
these interpretations to claim that propensities are testable like forces and masses in 
Newtonian mechanics as Gillies and Popper both claim.  
 
There is yet a third option. In a deflationary spirit we could consider the events that 
compose the sequence themselves as the bearers of the propensities. So it would be the 
outcomes of the experimental trials that bear the propensities. Since the probability 
distribution P is only defined over Ω, the outcome space, and not over the sequence of 
repetitions Ss, the propensity-to-probability half of the identity thesis would seem to fail. 
But this move again confronts the usual objections: the resulting theory is not long run 
(for each outcome of the experimental trial will presumably display the propensity), and 
propensity statements would not strictly speaking be falsifiable, but only the statistical 
hypotheses that they entail. Both problems would presumably be solved by expanding 
the probability distribution function Pn, while defining it over the Cartesian product of 
(Ss x Ωn). But this would come at the cost of a reintroduction of the identity thesis, and 
would not solve the HP objection. Etc. 
 
In summary, there are a number of ways to interpret Gillies’ theory. However, none of 
the interpretations simultaneously agree with all the explicit commitments of the theory 
and force a rejection of the identity thesis. In particular those interpretations that fit in 
with both the ‘long-run’ and ‘empiricist’ commitments explicit in Gillies’ theory are 
also committed to the identity thesis. As a consequence Gillies’ empiricist long-run 
version of the propensity theory cannot provide a solution to the HP objection in 
anything like the terms explored in this paper.  
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